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Abstract 
In december 1996 an accident occured on a cableway which 
caused the death of one passenger and injuries to several others. 
The cause of the tragic accident was the unexpected failure of the 
axle that carries the deflecting wheels for the wire rope. During the 
course of the official investigation it was demonstrated that the 
failure was due to a fatigue crack that had already propagated 
through a large portion of the cross-section. This fatigue crack had 
been initiated by fretting. 
Furthermore it was found that safety factors prescribed by the 
regulations for cableways had not sufficiently been considered in 
the design calculations. 
It also became clear that if different calculating philosophies are to 
be combined in a project great care is necessary in order to assure 
that all the important design parameters and failure modes are 
considered during the analyses, e.g. finite element calculations are 
employed together with design standards that contain overall 
factors, to account for stress concentrations and manufacturing 
inaccuracies 
In general it may be concluded that a simple compliance with the 
factors of safety will not always provide the necessary margin of 
safety against failure. Safety can only be guaranteed if all the 
important mechanisms of possible damage have been fully 




1 Case History 
In december 1996 an accident which occurred on a cableway caused one death, 
injuries to several others and a considerable interruption of the service. Up to the 
moment of the accident the cableway had been in operation for only one year. 
The design was identical to that of other cableways which had been reliable and were 
approved by the competent authority. 
 
Fig. 1  Cableway after the accident 
At the moment of the accident, the axle in the downhill station, that carries two 
deflecting wheels required to furnish the necessary pretension in the wire rope had 
broken. As a consequence one wheel had been hurled away and the wire rope had 
relaxed until it was held back by a concrete pillar. This slackening led to the fatal events. 
As turned out in the course of the failure analysis, similar cases had occurred in the past 
and have since been discussed in the literature (E. Corazza, 1997) 
 
 
2 Failure Analysis 
The failure analysis was performed by EMPA and covered the four main possible 
sources of such failures: material, design, manufacture and service. 
All the available documentation concerning the design calculations, fabrication, terms of 
the official approval and service conditions of the broken axle was procured. Afterwhich, 
the axle was subjected to a careful visual examination, to non-destructive testing and to 
metallographic tests. In addition the strength and the crack growth rate were measured 
and the critical stress determined. 
The thorough investigations showed that the axle had been broken because of a fatigue 
crack which had already covered approximately 50 % of the cross-section in only one 






Fig. 2  Axle for bull wheels of ropeway, 
(axle rotates, one wheel fixed) 
 
Fig. 3  Fracture surface of broken axle 
 
It was observed that the crack did not originate in the vicinity of the calculated high 
stress location but had been initiated by fretting corrosion under the seat of the hub of 
the bull wheel. 
 
The damage to the axle outer surface resulted from the simultaneous action of the 
pressure from the bull wheel hub and the very smalll but repeated relative slipping 
movement between the hub and the axle. This continual fretting action was responsible 
for the initiation of the crack as shown in Fig. 4 
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3 Comment on Design Procedure 
A check of the design integrity, which the manufacturer performed at the same time as 
the failure analysis was conducted, revealed that the design calculations did not comply 
with the updated mandatory regulations of the ordinance for circulating aerial tramways. 
Nevertheless the structures built to the old regulations had generally been in service 
problems. Therefore it was necessary to have a closer look at the calculation methods 
for such axles. 
As a machine element the axle in question is quite straightforward to dimension. One 
starts from simple bending stresses induced by the external loads, in this case the 
forces in the hauling rope, and calculates the maximum stress. This stress is then 
compared to the strength of the material and the corresponding safety factor is 
determined. 
In this simplified description of the procedure to determine the safety factor there was 
no mention of any regulatory specifications. Components designed for use in public 
transportation systems must comply with guidelines specified in the federal ordinance 
for aerial tramways. The specifications in the ordinance furnish rules for the loads and 
minimum safety factors to be respected. On the other hand, the code does not contain 
detailed guidelines concerning the design method. In mechanical engineering, it is 
general practice to employ modifying factors to account for separate effects of design 





4 Safety Factors 
4.1 Verification of Numerical Value - Influences 
If a structure has to be calculated, safety factors would not at all be needed if all the  
pertinent parameters were known, especially the service loads, the resistance of the 
material, the influence of stress concentrations and of inaccuracies in the manufacturing 
process. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case and times modifying factors are needed to take into 
account the effect arising from an increase in the external loads and a reduction in 
structural resistance. 
Generally a safety factor is expressed as follows: 
 
S=M/L, where  
S - safety factor; L - loads, M - material resistance, 
Safety is guaranteed as long as M>L, i.e. if M≥L•S. 
Here different philosophies are encountered: either M and L are determined as close to 
reality as possible and any uncertainties are included in S or to account for the 
uncertainties in M and L and then to need only a small safety margin in S. 
A further question is how to calculate a certain value of S. Normally, the structural 
resistance M is proportional to the product of the loaded cross section C and of a 
characteristic strength R, i.e.  
 
M ~ C•R.  
 
This simple expression reveals that a high value of M can be obtained by increasing C 
(the axle diameter), by using material with a higher strength or by varying both. Note, 
that a higher safety factor achieved through a shaft with larger diameters leads to a 
different state of stress and a stress gradient in bending as well as a completely 
different risk of damage.  
Mechanics show that it makes a large difference whether the cross-section, i.e. the 
diameter of an axle is made larger or a material with higher strength is used.  
In the calculation of stresses the diameter appears with an exponent of 3 and for 
deformations with an exponent of 4. Thus an increase of the diameter is much more 
effective for the calculation of the safety factoras compared to using a higher strength 
material. The main disadvantage in attaining a prescribed safety factor by an increase in 
the axle diameter is that this leads to larger bearings and housing and perhaps a bigger 
building. As a consequence, the overall cost could also increase. 
Even if the factor of safety were to comply with the design specifications, this alone is 
not sufficien t to guarantee that a failure will not occur. It is also essential to identify and 
analyze the most critical mechanisms of damage that could otherwise result in 
catastrophic consequences. In fact, fretting fatigue was responsible for this aerial 
tramway accident. Fretting fatigue has been discussed in quite a number of conferences 
and is still a challenge for design engineers (Kieselbach, 1994). 
A very important parameter in the phenomenon of fretting fatigue is the amplitude of 
slip. For this particular accident, the slip resulted from the relative motion of the hub and 
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the axle as it deformed during bending. From fig.5 can be seen that 3 different regimes 
of slip can be identified. For large amplitudes fatigue life is not reduced significantly and 
damage is mainly by abrasion; for very low amplitudes there is no wear and no 
reduction of fatigue life. The problem evidently lies in the region in between where 
fretting takes place. If the slip amplitude can be reduced by increasing the stiffness then 
fretting fatigue would no longer be a problem. 
 




The following simple calculation shows that increasing the diameter instead of the 
material strength is advantageous in bending. A bending moment of 255 kNm applied at 
the critical point of a (notched solid round) shaft having a stress factor of 2.22 and a 
safety factor of 2, one obtains the following relation for the fatigue strength σa as a 





255 10 4 36
3
.44 2
 as shown in Fig. 6. 
Obviously this figure is theoretical in nature, since a fatigue strength of more than 500 
MPa cannot be achieved for quenched and tempered steels. Therefore the alternative 



















Fig. 6  Relation between strength and diameter of a shaft 
4.2 Problems with the Combination of Different Calculation Methods 
Numerical calculations using the method of finite elements are more frequent 
nowadays. On the other hand, it is necessary to demonstrate for structures or 
components that the stresses and perhaps safety factors comply with the specifications 
in mandatory codes. 
This now leads to a special problem: Is it possible to determine a state of stress in a 
structure, even if it is of complex shape and loaded in a complex way with an arbitrary 
accuracy which is limited only by the capacity of the computer? Most standards and 
ordinances used for calculations nowadays are still based on the assumption that it is 
not possible to exactly determine stress concentrations and therefore provide categories 
for groups of loading conditions, load spectra etc. The stress concentrations are then 
accounted for by an appropriate reduction of the permissible stress for the material in 
question. 
A standard which is often used in different european countries for the calculation of 





Fig. 7  Example of a structure loaded in 
tension with a force F, having a stress 
concentration at the hole B where the 
load is introduced 
 
To determine the permissible stress in a structure like that of Fig. 7 using a standard like 
DIN 15018 one has to calculate first the nominal stress for a certain part by a method 
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which is not specified in the standard and then to assign the groups for the appropriate 
load spectra, design details etc. This yields the permissible stress according to the 
standard. In general the result contains a superimposition of several safety factors. 
The problem arises when regulations of the administration contain mandatory safety 
factors which also have to account for these uncertainties. In order to avoid that certain 
phenomena are accounted  for more than once which would lead to an 
overdimensioned structure, it is important to know which factors , specified in the codes, 
have been already included in the calculation. Unfortunately, clarifications concerning 
the method of combining or interfacing different calculation techniques are seldom 
found in the codes. 
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4.3 Cleverness in Design 
 
bearings
bull wheel bull wheel
Fig. 8  Design with fixed axle and rotating bull 
wheels 
 
If the design of the axle is changed as shown in Fig. 8 one gains two advantages. In the 
first place, one bearing less is needed and also the span-set for fixing one of the wheels 
is not necessary. The second, most important, advantage is that the mode of stressing 
changes from rotating bending to simple bending. From the Smith-diagram for fatigue 
strength shown in Fig. 9 one sees that for alternating bending the maximum permissible 
stress corresponds to point A (with a safety factor of 2) whereas for simple bending at 












Fig. 9  Smith-diagram for fatigue strength of steel 42CrMo4 
 
5 Summary  
The accident of the aerial tramway can be attributed to a combination of a weak design 
and an oversight in the calculations (safety factor too small). A further consideration 
shows that a prescribed value of a safety factor can prevent failure only if all the 
possible mechanisms of damage have been accounted for in the design.  
The ability to identify and analyze such mechanisms is a quality that comes with 
experience or knowhow. Thus, it is strongly recommended that engineers or designers 
involved with the dimensioning of critical structures or components be trained to identify 
and analyze such subtle but critical phenomena. 
In combining different calculation methods it is important to perform this with caution so 
as not to consider the safety requirements more than once. Otherwise, this could lead to 
an overdimensioned structure or component, i.e., unnecessaryly heavy and expensive. 
At times, a design can be made more efficient by optimizing the kind, number and 
location of the support and fixation points. This would lead to a substantiall increase in 
safety and at the same time avoid certain critical damaging mechanisms. 
An additional problem is that designers do not adequately take into account and 
incorporate experience and existing know-how but do rely too much sometimes on 
calculations by finite. Special care has to be taken also in simplification of design 
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